Social Policy
Contents on this page:
Policy papers:
See here for a two page summary of CFN Policy and Applications (pdf).
Background
By providing a unified picture of ourselves embedded in nature,
culture, and biology, inclusive naturalism serves as the basis
for enlightened social policies. Currently, the commonly accepted
supernaturalistic view of ourselves as having contra-causal free
will prevents understanding the causes behind human behavior, while
setting up individuals for unlimited recrimination and rewards.
The widespread idea that persons are causally privileged over everything
else in nature - that they are uncaused first causes - deflects
attention from environmental and biological conditions which shape
personality and behavior, thus retarding progress towards a more
compassionate, less punitive culture. The highly skewed distribution
of resources based on the notion of the self-made self, that those
who succeed ultimately deserve their success since they possess
some sort of metaphysical originative merit, is another consequence
of the free will myth. Philosopher John Rawls pointed out years
ago that no one deserves the talents and station in life they are
born into; it's all a matter of luck (see note 1). This insight
is the basis for the egalitarian political philosophy expressed
in A Theory of Justice and later works.
A naturalistic understanding of ourselves has major social implications
centered on 1) criminal justice and deviance and 2) social and
economic justice. In what follows, the harmful consequences of
the myth of libertarian, contra-causal free will for social policy
are discussed, followed by the benefits of replacing that myth
with inclusive naturalism.
Criminal Justice and Deviance
Negatives stemming from the free will myth:
- Retributive attitudes supporting harsh criminal sanctions. If
offenders are seen as the ultimate source of their deviance (e.g.,
addiction) and criminality, then they are deemed deserving of punishment
on the grounds that they could have overcome their environmental
and biological circumstances, but simply chose not to do so. This
sense of strong, ultimate desert is used to justify capital punishment
and punitive incarceration over and above that necessary for rehabilitation
or deterrence. Such punishment reinforces and perpetuates violence
and maladaptive behavior, leaving in its wake vast and unnecessary
suffering.
- Ineffective social policy. To the extent criminality and harmful
deviance are understood to arise from individuals' undetermined
choices, their true social and economic causes will go unaddressed.
The myth of libertarian freedom essentially lets us off the hook
from having to thoroughly investigate and remedy the root causes
of dysfunction, and so the cycle of crime and punitive response
repeats indefinitely. Free will is the bottom line excuse and justification
for laissez faire and ineffective social policies which guarantee
high levels of criminality and dysfunction.
Positives stemming from inclusive naturalism:
- Softening of retributive attitudes. Understanding that people
don't create themselves, but instead are fully included in the
causal matrix of environmental and biological conditions, undercuts
retributive blaming focused on the person. This should help reduce
the demand for capital punishment and harsh prison conditions.
The aims of criminal justice might shift from the retributive imposition
of just deserts to public safety, rehabilitation, victim restoration
and reconciliation, and the prevention of recidivism (see note
2 and the Criminal Justice page).
- Enlightened social policy. Inclusive naturalism leads to the
conclusion that an individual's development and behavior are
fully a function of biological and social conditions, in which
case the desire for a better, less punitive society should lead
us to address these conditions. No longer will the free will
myth excuse inaction on the grounds that people willfully choose
their criminality, addiction, etc. Moral distinctions will still
be made, but moralistic responses will be lessened in favor of
interventions (e.g., economic and social investment and reform)
which actually alleviate the causes of criminality.
- Policy initiatives: see proposal for Council on Crime and Causality.
Social and Economic Justice
Negatives stemming from the free will myth:
- Economic and social inequality. The widespread assumption of
libertarian freedom, which states that an individual is at bottom
self-made, works to justify and excuse huge differences in material
well-being and social advantages. Those that fail economically,
on this understanding, fail because of a willful refusal to apply
themselves or follow the rules. Since it was their bottom-line
choice not to get ahead, they deserve their misery. Likewise, those
that succeed deserve their riches, however excessive or disproportionate,
since they made themselves who they are. The huge inequalities
between rich and poor are tolerated partially because they are
thought to reflect differences in metaphysical merit derived from
the differential exercise of free will.
- Ineffective social policy. To the extent that economic and social
inequality are believed to result from human choices unaffected
by surrounding conditions (the definition of libertarian freedom),
such inequality will be perceived as the natural outcome of self-chosen
individual differences, not anything that could or should be remedied
by social policy. Social programs and income redistribution, therefore,
will be only thought capable of operating around the margins of
what is essentially up to human free will. The free will assumption,
therefore, disempowers and defeats interventions to reduce inequality
in advance by implying they cannot be effective, or that they somehow
infringe our right to ultimate self-determination. (Of course if
we really had libertarian free will, our self-determination couldn't
be infringed upon.)
Positives stemming from inclusive naturalism:
- The end of metaphysical merit. Inclusive naturalism shows that
an individual's economic and social success is entirely a function
of family status, innate talents, and numerous other environmental
and biological factors, not free will (see Rawls quote below, note
1). Successful individuals can no longer claim that their riches
are deserved in the deep, metaphysical sense of having created
themselves and their success ex nihilo. Nor can those who end up
on the bottom be blamed for their failure on the grounds they could
have chosen otherwise, given the circumstances that obtained. Social
and economic inequality will be understood as the luck of the draw,
not a reflection of metaphysical merit. This will undercut justifications
for inequality based on the notions of deserved entitlement and
deserved failure.
- Egalitarian social policy. If success and failure come to be
understood as entirely a matter of environmental and biological
conditions, not a reflection of self-created will, then social
and economic inequalities can no longer be defended on the grounds
that they are somehow deserved. This will undercut support for
laissez-faire social policies that permit huge discrepancies in
wealth and opportunity, and increase support for interventions
that improve both opportunities and outcomes for the disadvantaged.
Although incentives must still exist to encourage hard work and
risk-taking, they need not result in a grossly skewed distribution
of goods. Inclusive naturalism will shift the justification for
having a reasonable standard of living from what's deserved to
what's needed to avoid suffering.
Notes:
(1) "It seems to be one of the fixed points of our considered
judgments that no one deserves his place in the distribution of
native endowments, any more than one deserves one's initial starting
place in society. The assertion that a man deserves the superior
character that enables him to make the effort to cultivate his
abilities is equally problematic; for his character depends in
large part upon fortunate family and social circumstances for which
he can claim no credit. The notion of desert seems not to apply
to these cases" (Rawls, p. 104 A Theory of Justice).
(2) See Derk Pereboom's book, Living Without Free Will, Ted Honderich's
book, How Free Are You?, and Paul Breer's book, The Spontaneous
Self, for arguments in favor of policy change in the light of inclusive
naturalism, especially in criminal justice. See Honderich's website
for brief version of Pereboom's radical thesis on dismantling institutions
of punishment. Note, however, that belief in naturalism is no guarantee
of softer attitudes on criminal justice, desert, and blame. See,
for instance, my review of Michael Moore's book, Placing Blame,
in which he defends retributive justice despite his acknowledgement
that we don't have libertarian freedom, and my exchange with David
Hill on What Justifies Retribution, Precisely?.
Back to top
|
